We implement one-out-of-two bit oblivious transfer (OT) based on the assumptions used in the McEliece cryptosystem: the hardness of decoding random binary linear codes, and the difficulty of distinguishing a permuted generating matrix of Goppa codes from a random matrix. To our knowledge this is the first OT reduction to these problems only.
Introduction
Oblivious transfer [30, 26, 11 ] is a primitive of central importance in modern cryptography as it implies two-party secure computation [15, 19] and multi-party computation [9] . There exist several flavors of OT, but they are all equivalent [8] . In this work, we focus on the so-called one-out-of-two oblivious transfer (OT). This is a two-party primitive where a sender (Alice) inputs two bits b0, b1 and a receiver (Bob) inputs a bit c called the choice bit. Bob receives b c and remains ignorant about b 1−c , while Alice only receives a confirmation message from Bob after he completed his part of the protocol successfully. In particular, Alice cannot learn Bob's choice.
OT can be constructed based on computational assumptions, both generic such as enhanced trapdoor permutations [11, 13, 16] and specific such as factoring [26] , DiffieHellman [3, 24 , 1], Quadratic or Higher-Order Residuosity, or from the Extended Riemann Hypothesis [17] . Our result: We build OT based on the two assumptions used in the McEliece cryptosystem [22] : (1) hardness of decoding of a random linear code (known to be NP-complete [4] , and known to be equivalent to the learning parity with noise (LPN) problem [27] ); and (2) indistinguishability of the scrambled generating matrix of the Goppa code [21] from a random one.
Comparison to other work: To our knowledge, this is the first oblivious transfer protocol based on the McEliece assumptions only and, concurrently with [18] , the first computationally secure oblivious transfer protocol not known to be broken by a quantum computer. However, for obtaining a protocol of equivalent complexity, [18] uses additional assumptions: the random oracle assumption and permuted kernels. Also, [18] needs Shamir's zero knowledge proofs [29] which are avoided in our simpler construction. Our protocol is unconditionally secure for Bob and computationally secure for Alice.
In this work, we consider only static adversaries, i.e., we assume that either Alice or Bob is corrupted before the protocol begins.
Preliminaries
In this section, we establish our notation and provide some facts from coding theory and formal definitions of security for oblivious transfer and bit commitment. Then, for the sake of completeness, we describe the McEliece cryptosystem and introduce the assumptions on which its security, and also the security of our protocol is based.
Henceforth, we will denote by x ∈R D a uniformly random choice of element x from its domain D; and by ⊕ a bit-wise exclusive OR of strings. All logarithms are to the base 2.
Two sequences {Xn} n∈N and {Yn} n∈N of random variables are called computationally indistinguishable, denoted X c = Y , if for every non-uniform probabilistic polynomial-time distinguisher D there exists a negligible function (·) such that for every n ∈ N,
Security Definition of Oblivious Transfer
Let us denote by V iew A ( A(z), B(c)) and V iew B (A(b0, b1), B(z)) the views of dishonest Alice and Bob, respectively, which represent their inputs z, results of all local computations, and messages exchanged. Our definition of security is based on the one shown in [17] (conveniently adapted to protocols with more than two messages). 
A protocol is said to be secure against honest-but-curious players, if the previous definition holds in the case Alice and Bob follow the protocol. An oblivious-transfer protocol is unconditionally secure against a player if the given properties hold even when this player is not computationally bounded.
Security Definition of String Commitment
We also need commitment schemes in our constructions. A string commitment protocol consists of two stages. In the first one, called Commit, the sender (Alice) provides the receiver (Bob) with evidence about her input bit-string b. Bob cannot learn it before the second stage, called Open, where Alice reveals her commitment to Bob, such that she cannot open a value different from b without being caught with high probability. Let us denote by V iew A ( A(z), B(a) ) and V iew B (A(b), B(z)) the views of dishonest Alice and Bob, respectively, which represent their inputs z, results of all local computations, and messages exchanged. Our definition is based on [23] . A string commitment protocol is unconditionally secure against a player if the properties in Definition 2 hold even when this player is not computationally bounded.
McEliece Cryptosystem
The folowing definition was taken from [18] . The McEliece cryptosystem [22] consists of a triplet of probabilistic algorithms ME = (Gen ME , Enc ME , Dec ME ) and M = {0, 1} k .
• Key generation algorithm: The PPT key generation algorithm Gen ME works as follows:
1. Generate a k × n generator matrix G of a Goppa code, where we assume that there is an efficient error-correction algorithm Correct which can always correct up to t errors. 2. Generate a k × k random non-singular matrix S. 3. Generate a n × n random permutation matrix T. 4. Set P = SGT, and output pk = (P, t) and sk = (S, G, T).
• Encryption algorithm: Enc ME takes a plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} k and the public-key pk as input and outputs ciphertext c = mP ⊕ e, where e ∈ {0, 1} n is a random vector of Hamming weight t.
• Encryption algorithm: DecME works as follows:
Security Assumptions
In this subsection, we briefly introduce and discuss the McEliece assumptions used in this work. First, we assume that there is no efficient algorithm which can distinguish the scrambled (according to the description in the previous Subsection) generating matrix of the Goppa code P and a random matrix of the same size. Currently, the best algorithm by Courtois et al. [7] works as follows: enumerate each Goppa polynomial and verify whether the corresponding code and the generator matrix G are "permutation equivalent" or not by using the support splitting algorithm [28] , which is n t (1 + o(1))-time algorithm, with n and t as defined in the previous subsection.
Assumption 3. There is no PPT algorithm which can distinguish the public-key matrix P of the McEliece cryptosystem from a random matrix of the same size with nonnegligible probability.
We note that this assumption was utilized in [7] to construct a digital signature scheme.
The underlying assumption on which McEliece is the hardness of decoding random linear codes. This problem is known to be NP-complete [4] , and all currently known algorithms to solve this problem are exponential. In particular, for small number of errors, the best one was presented by Canteaut and Chabaud [6] . 
String Commitment from Syndrome Decoding
We will need a bit commitment scheme based on the same assumption. Of course we could use a modification of the McEliece system which is semantical secure, see [25] . However, we can do better.
According to a well-known result by Naor [23] , bit commitment scheme can be constructed using a pseudorandom generator. The latter primitive can be built efficiciently using the Syndrome Decoding problem as described by Fischer and Stern [12] . Naor's scheme is unconditionally binding, computationally hiding and meets the completeness property. So using this construction we are using only one of the McEliece assumption. In addition, for string commitment Naor's construction is very efficient.
Passively Secure Protocol for OT
For now, assume Alice and Bob to be honest-but-curious. We first sketch the intuition behind this protocol. We construct it according to the paradigm presented in [3] . Bob sends to Alice an object which is either a public key or a randomized public key for which the decoding problem is difficult. To randomize a public key, we use bitwise-XOR with a random matrix. Alice, in turn, computes the bitwise-XOR of the received entity with the same random matrix, hereby obtaining the second "key". She encrypts b 0 and b1 with the received and computed keys, respectively, and sends the encryptions to Bob. The protocol is secure for Bob because Alice cannot distinguish a public key from a random matrix. The protocol is complete because Bob can always decrypt bc. At the same time, it is also secure for Alice, because Bob is unable to decrypt the second bit as he cannot decode the random code.
Recall that Alice's inputs are the bits b0 and b1 while Bob inputs the bit c wishing to receive b c .
Protocol 5.
1. Alice chooses a k × n random binary matrix Q and sends it to Bob.
Bob generates a secret key (S, G, T ) following the procedures of the McEliece
algorithm, sets P c = SGT and P 1−c = P c ⊕ Q and sends P 0 , t to Alice.
3. Alice computes P 1 = P 0 ⊕Q, then encrypts two random bit strings r 0 , r 1 ∈ R {0, 1} k with P 0 and P 1 , respectively, i.e., for i = 0, 1 : Proof. Given that under passive attacks, the players always follow the protocol, we argue the properties listed in Definition 1. Note that Q is chosen randomly and independently from P c , so from B's point of view, learning r 1−c is equivalent to decoding a random linear code with generating matrix Pc ⊕ Q. This is known to be hard [4] . It was proven in [14] that r, m is a hard-core predicate for any one-way function f given f (r) and m. Hence, by Assumption 4, the distribution (taken over Alice's randomness) of runs ofB(z) using randomness R with Alice having input b c and b c = 0 is computationally indistinguishable from the distribution of runs with Alice having input bc and bc = 1. Security for Bob: This follows directly from Assumption 3. Honest-but-curious Alice is unable to distinguish between P = SGT and a random k × n matrix, and hence she is also unable to tell P c = SGT from P 1−c = SGT ⊕ Q for any c ∈ {0, 1}. This implies computational indistinguishability of the protocol views for Alice.
Unfortunately, Protocol 5 is not secure if the parties cheat actively. One problem is that, given a random matrix Q, Bob can come up with two matrices P , P , where P ⊕ P = Q, such that they are the generating matrices of the codes with some reasonably good decoding properties. It is clear that in this case, Bob will be able to partially decode both b 0 and b 1 .
Fully Secure Protocol
In order to arm the passive protocol with security against malicious parties we will do the following:
1. Implement a randomized oblivious transfer in which Bob is forced to choose his the public key before and therefore independent of Q, if not he will be detected with probability at least 1 2 .
2. Convert the randomized oblivious transfer into an oblivious transfer for specific inputs with the same characteristics of security;
3. Reduce the probability that a malicious Bob learns both b 0 and b 1 .
Random OT with high probability of B cheating
First, we implement a protocol that outputs two random bits a 0 , a 1 to Alice and outputs a random bit d and a d to Bob. In this protocol, Alice detects with probability at least 1 2 − a malicious Bob that chooses the public key dependenting of Q. To achieve this, Bob generates two different McEliece keys by following the same procedures of protocol 5 and by using two random bits c0, c1. He commits to P0,c 0 and P 1,c 1 . Then, Bob receives two random matrices Q 0 and Q 1 from Alice, computes P 0,1−c 0 = P 0,c 0 ⊕ Q 0 and P 1,1−c 1 = P 1,c 1 ⊕ Q 1 and sends P 0,0 , P 1,0 , t to her. Alice chooses one of the commitments for Bob to open and checks if the opened information is consistent with an honest procedure; otherwise, she stops the protocol. Finally, she encrypts a 0 and a 1 using the matrices associated to the commitment that was not opened.
Protocol 7. (S0, G0, T0) and (S1, G1, T1) . He chooses c 0 , c 1 ∈ R {0, 1} and sets P 0,c 0 = S 0 G 0 T 0 and P 1,c 1 = S 1 G 1 T 1 . He commits to P0,c 0 and P1,c 1 .
Bob generates two McEliece secret keys
2. Alice chooses Q0 and Q1 uniformly at random and sends them to Bob. 4. Alice computes P 0,1 = P 0,0 ⊕ Q 0 and P 1,1 = P 1,0 ⊕ Q 1 . Then she chooses the challenge j ∈ R {0, 1} and sends it to Bob.
Bob computes
5. Bob opens his commitment to P 1−j,c 1−j and sets d = c j 6. Alice checks the following: P 1−j,c 1−j must be equal to P 1−j,0 or P 1−j,1 , otherwise she stops the protocol.
7. Alice encrypts two random bit strings r 0 , r 1 ∈ R {0, 1} k with P j,0 and P j,1 , respectively, i.e., for i = 0, 1 :
k , encrypts a0, a1 ∈R {0, 1} as follows: for i = 0, 1 : In order to discover a 0 and a 1 , Bob must learn r 0 and r 1 . The encryptions of r0 and r1 only depend on Pj,0 and Pj,1, respectively.
If Bob sends both P 0,0 and P 1,0 chosen according to the protocol (honest procedure), then the probability that he learns both inputs of Alice is the same as in the passive protocol, i.e., it is negligible. If Bob chooses in a malicious way both P0,0 and P1,0, then with overwhelming probability Alice will stop the protocol in step 6 and Bob will learn neither r0 nor r1.
The best strategy for Bob is to choose honestly one of the matrices and choose the other in a malicious way, thus he can cheat and partially decode both r 0 and r 1 in case Alice asks him to open the matrix correctly chosen. However, note that with probability 1 2 , Alice asks him to open the matrix maliciously chosen. In this case, Bob will be able to open the commitment with the value that Alice expects in step 6 only with negligible probability. Thus, the probability that a malicious Bob learns both a 0 and a 1 is at most 1 2 + (n) where (n) is a negligible function. Security for Bob: The commitment to P j,c j = P j,d is not opened, so the security for Bob follows from Assumption 3 as in the protocol 5.
As long as the commitment is secure, possible differences from the passive scenario are the following ones:
• Alice could cheat by sending a specially chosen matrix Q, however by Assumption 3, she cannot tell P j,c j from random, hence her choice of Q will not affect her ability to learn d;
• For some i ∈ {0, 1}, Alice may use a different matrix instead of P j,i for encrypting r i in Step 7 hoping that i = d so that Bob will encounter the decoding error and then complain, hereby disclosing his choice. However, the last instruction of Step 8 thwarts such attack by forcing Bob to accept with a fixed output "0". Sending a "wrong" syndrome is then equivalent to the situation when Alice sets his input a i = 0.
Thus, it follows that the protocol is secure against Alice.
Derandomizing the previous protocol
Subsequently, we use the method of [2] to transform the randomized oblivious transfer into an (ordinary) oblivious transfer with the same characteristics of security. 
Reducing the probability of B cheating
Finally, we use the reduction of [10] to minimize the probability that a malicious Bob learns both inputs of Alice. In this reduction, protocol 9 is executed s times in parallel, where s is a security parameter. The inputs in each execution are chosen in such way that Bob must learn both bits in all executions to be able to compute both inputs of Alice in protocol 11.
Protocol 11.
Proof. Completeness: An honest Bob learns all b c,i for i = 1 . . . s in the s executions of protocol 9 and therefore he can compute b c . Security for Alice: Bob must discover both bits in all executions of protocol 9 in order to learn something simultaneously on b 0 and b 1 . The probability that a malicious Bob learns both bits in an execution of protocol 9 is at most 1 2 + (n), where (n) is a negligible function. There exists an n 0 such that (n) < 1 4 for any n > n 0 . We can choose n > n0, so β = 1 2 + (n) < 3 4 and the probability that a malicious Bob learns both b 0 and b 1 is less than (
s , which is negligible in s. Thus, the protocol is secure for Alice. Security for Bob: Alice discovers c if she learns any ci, but this probability is negligible because the probability that she learns a specific c i in the respective execution of the protocol 9 is negligible and the number of executions of the protocol 9 is polynomial.
